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BOOK REVIEWS
A Sholt Historical Introduction to the Law of Real Property. By J.
John Lawler and Gail Gates Lawler. Chicago: For the Authors by
The Foundation Press. 1940. Pp. xxii, 204. $2.50.
Upon the sound premise that "Real Property Law can be understood only in the light of its historical evolution," the stated objective
of the authors is to compile for first-year law students an introduction
to the subject in the form of a short digest of the principal text authorities in the field. A desirable feature is unitary treatment of each concept, instead of scattered consideration throughout the book. But for
such a method to succeed in a book for beginners ample cross-references
are necessary, and they do not appear in sufficient numbers in this
volume. A useful bibliography of text citations occurs at the end of
each chapter, but since chapter two, estates in land, includes more than
half of the book, it would have been a more convenient arrangement
had the bibliography as to each estate occurred at the conclusion of
consideration of such estate, rather than all being lumped together at
the end of the disproportionately long chapter two.
As to treatment and reliability of substance, the volume contains
some very good sections, but as a whole it suffers by reason of statements concerning contemporary law or legal history that seem subject
to question as to accuracy or lucidity. Lack of space preventing consideration of all unsatisfactory portions of the work, only selected sections are discussed.
Section 49. As to the distinction between freehold and non-freehold
estates, it is said: "The duration of freehold estates is always an uncertain period. .. . The non-freehold estates . . . always have a definite
period of termination." While uncertainty of duration is true of all
freeholds, definiteness of time of termination is not a characteristic of
the non-freeholds, tenancy at will and at sufferance.'
Section 52. Speaking of the fee simple absolute, it is said "that in
Glanville's time at the close of the twelfth century, the consent of the
presumptive heirs was essential to the validity of a conveyance by the
first taker." This assertion seems to need qualification. According to
Glanville, a relatively extensive liberty of inter ?vios conveyance of
freeholds was enjoyed by an ancestor without the consent of the presumptive heirs.2

I1GLANvLLE
TIFFANY, REAL PROPRaTY (3d ed. 1939) §25.
(Beames transl. 1900) 114-119, 124. Compare 2 POLLOCK AND
MATLAND, HIsToRY OF ENGLIsH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 13, 308-313; WiLIAMs, REAL
2

PROPERTY

(24th ed. 1926) 98, n. (u).
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Section 62. The naive description of the rise of the Court of Chancery as depicted in the last paragraph of this section seems more misleading than enlightening. The man who came in time to be a court
of equity did not gain that position just because he was the king's chaplain as seems intimated by the authors. It was because he was a great
law officer of the kingdom-head of the administrative Chancery department and member of the King's Council from which his equity jurisdiction at first emanated. 3
Section 68. It is stated that "the effect of the Statute of Enrollments was not to compel all grantees to make their holdings of title
matter of record, although that very probably had been the purpose of
its draftsmen. The Statute . . . applied only where one person was
seised to the use of another." This statute required enrollment of only
one type of transfer, the bargain and sale of a freehold; and the inference that the conveyance of a freehold by covenant to stand seised was
within its purview is erroneous. 4
Sections 83, 84, 85. In these three sections two different types of
defeasible fees simple are treated: the fee simple determinable and the
fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. It is here said that "in
1831 a conveyancer named Saunders [sic], writing on the subject of
Uses and Trusts, stated it to be his opinion that the Statute of Quia
Emptores had made the creation of both of these types of qualified
estates in fee simple impossible." While Sanders did say that there
could be no fee simple determinable since Quia Emptores, he appears
to have made no such assertion with regard to the fee simple subject
to a condition subsequent. 5 And although it is true, as the authors
say, that Gray followed "the heresy of Saunders" he 'did not misstate
it by including the fee simple subject to a condition subsequent as
within the mischief of Quia Emptores. 6
Section 112(b). In discussing dower in the United States, it is said
that "the common law concept of dower . . . has been changed everywhere." This statement seems erroneous. An authoritative work in the
field says: "Fifteen jurisdictions have substantially retained common
law dower in general,
law dower. Eight states have retained common
17
rights."
generous
more
other
added
but have
Section 124. With regard to the twelfth century position of tenant
for years who was ousted by his lessor, contradictory statements are
31 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (4th ed. 1931) (hereinafter cited
as HOLDS.) 395-405; LEaDmM AND BAUwIN, SELEcr CASES BEFORE THE KINGdS
COUNCIL (1243-1482) 35 Selden Soc. XXIII-XXV.

'4 HOLDS. 427, 462; 7 id. 356,-362.
'SANDERS, USES AND TRUSTS (2d Am. ed. 1835) 208-213.
1 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPUITIES (3d ed. 1915) §§31, 32. And see 1 SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §178.
73 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS

(1935) §§188, 189.
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made. First, it is asserted that he cannot regain the land by legal action
and then it is said that he may do so. The latter seems correct.8
Sections 125, 130. As to the termor's liability for meliorative waste
at English law it is said that "it was decided quite early that a tenant
for years could not be held liable for ameliorative waste . . . unless it
was an injury from the point of view of the lessor." As late as the
seventeenth century an alteration increasing the value of the property
was waste.9 It is stated that "liability of the tenant for ... ameliorative
waste . . . has been recognized in this country from the beginning of
our case law." While this may be correct, there has been a tendency
to recognize waste in law only where there is waste in fact; but there
is some conffict among the decisions. 10
Section 129. It is here said: "technically the American states are
said to have adopted the common law as of the fourth year of James I
(1607), since that was the date of the first settlement." Since the reception statutes of the several states vary as to the date from which adoption is made, the authors' statement is not entirely accurate.'1
Section 132. Speaking of assignments and subleases by tenant for
years, it is asserted that "if the tenant can assign without such consent
[the lessor's] he can not only place an undesirable tenant on the premises, but he can also avoid his own responsibility for rent." This
statement is erroneous if the word "tenant" includes any other person
than an assignee.12
Section 141. As to termination of periodic tenancies, it is said that
most states have statutes requiring the lessor to give advance notice"sually ninety days of the last day of the current period." In this
connection, another writer shows that "there is a wide variation among
the statutes of the various states with respect to the length of notice
required."' s
Section 146. Speaking of intestate succession in the United States
it is asserted that "we have abolished the distinction between heirs and
next-of-kin." While this statement is correct as to the great majority
of states, there are a few jurisdictions as to which it is untrue.14
Section 147. As to rent of non-freeholds at common law and in the
United States, it is said that rent has "two entirely different aspects":
in one respect it is an incorporeal hereditament, and in the other an
82 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 106.
97 HOLDS. 277.
'oNotes (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1130, (1929) 27 MIcH. L. -REv. 587.
" Pope, The English Common Law it the United States (1910) 24 HARv.
L. Rzv.
6.
121 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1912) §158 a, n.; Note (1937) 37
CoL. L. REv. 870.
" Marcus, Periodic Tenancies-Regulationby Statute (1939) 8 FoRD. L. REv.
355, 359, 363.
" ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) 46, n. 38.
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executory obligation. Under feudal law rent was regarded only as a
thing issuing out of the land and was not an obligation of contract, but
in modem times the latter aspect is also recognized. 15 It is also stated
that rent "arises out of the reversion." On the contrary, in legal contemplation it arises out of the particular estate in the land held by the
tenant.16
Sections 151, 154. It is stated that "the disability to create a power
of termination in a third person caused no hardship after the enactment
of the Statute of Uses and the Statute of Wills. . . . Under those
statutes, the grantor could effectuate his object by means of executory
limitations which were freely transferable." Executory interests were
not freely transferable at English common law,17 and there are two
noteworthy objections to the suggested substitutionary efficacy of the
executory interest. A right of entry affords to its holder an option of
termination of the subject estate, which volition does not normally exist
as to an executory interest except by virtue of a conveyee's right of
disclaimer; and in this country* an executory interest is subject to the
rule against perpetuities while a right of entry is not so subject. 18
Section 215. The present-day conveyancing utility of "powers of
appointment in the United States" seems to entitle such concept to more
19
consideration than the three and one-half lines devoted to it.
Section 259. With regard to tenancy by the entireties at common
law, it is asserted that "there was only unity of possession in an estate
so held." Being a species of joint tenancy, tenancy by the entireties
embraces the four unities of interest, title, time and possession plus the
20
unity of person peculiar to its existence.
Conclusion: By implication at least, Lord Macnaghten has said that
the Rule in Shelley's Case may be put in a nutshell but cannot be kept
there. 21 The reviewer feels that an adequate historical treatment of the
Anglo-American law of real property will not go into a nutshell. In
about one hundred and ninety brief pages of text the authors have
made a valiant effort to do the impossible-to state in digest form
appropriate for first-year law students the essentials of not only the
" 7 Homs. 262-275; 1. TIFFANY, op. cit. supra,note 12, §§165, 171; Stone, A
Primer on Rent (1939) 13

" GILBERT,
(Pa. 1834).

TULANE

L. REV. 329.

(1758) 20-27. And see Bank of Pa. v. Wise, 3 Watts 394
"'3 SImEs, op. cit. supra note 6, §712. And see section 209 of the volume
RENTS

under rhview in which the authors qualify this earlier statement.
182 SIMES, op. cit. supra note 6, §§498, 506.
A to present-day utility and comparative emphasis, see LEACH, CASES AND
MATERIALS oN THE Liw oF Furua~i INTERESTSI (2d ed. 1940) 574; SIMES, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS

(1939)

283.

However, stressing of

powers of appointment in American land law is deprecated by at least one
authority. Bordwell, Book Review (1939) 53 HAuv. L. REV. 157, 159.
202 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§418, 430.
Van Grutten v. Foxwell (1897) App. Cas. 658, 671.
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English common law of land but the modem American law as well. In
such an undertaking the necessity for very broad generalizations must
almost inevitably invite error of detail. While a skeletal treatment may
provide the mature student with a very useful index of the law of real
property, the first-year student attempting to grasp the common law
scheme of the land law with all its difficult archaisms, needs to have
pointed out to him not only what the law is, but why it is what it is.
Hence, a proper understanding of the concepts requires that they be
set in a frame of the political, social, economic and intellectual conditions that gave them birth. Too often absent in the real property treatises, this appears unattainable in an abridgement.
W. BRYAN BOLICH.
School of Law
Duke University
Studies in Legal Terminology. By Erwin Hexner. Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press. 1941. Pp. vi, 150. $1.50.
The title of this book is by no means indicative of the problems
that constitute its principal subject-matter. That its author was clearly
aware of this is apparent from the statement in the preface that "often
behind what seems to be merely terminological issues are concealed
vital political problems." It is, accordingly, necessary to treat this series
of essays as a study in legal and political values. It is quite evident that
the author is concerned with developing a theory of the essential elements of the concept "legal system" that will exclude the modem totalitarian states from the class of politically organized societies that deserye
the name of Rechtsstaat. It should, however, be remarked that he is
not necessarily determined to deny that they may possess a legal system,
but only to establish that the concept "legal system" will require a
wholly different definition from that which would fit states not organized on the totalitarian basis. This approach implies a relativistic
attitude towards the delimitation of the elements entering into any given
concept. It also implies that the author's defense of a concept composed
of the particular elements he has chosen to treat as its essentials is
ultimately based on a preference for the human and social values secured by a state possessing a legal system which meets his standard.
In a real sense, therefore, is this book concerned with a theory of
social values even though this is not thrust into the foreground of the
argument.
The discussion proceeds by way of a gradual development of the
elements essential to the concept of a legal system. The first essay is
devoted to defining the place of a legal system in that complex of rule
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systems through which modern societies regulate the conduct of their
members. The author rightly holds that there exist many interrelations
among those several rule systems and the legal system. It is quite
evilent that he favors a society in which there are such complementary
rule systems rather than one in which all human activities are subjected
to state regimentation. Having defined the place of a legal system in a
politically organized society he next develops its elements. For him
the concept implies a large number of legal rules, each of which derives
its significance from being a part of the system. He opposes this to
the view that a legal system could consist of a single unwritten rule
vesting the whole governmental power of a society in a single man.
Legal rules are divided into general rules consisting of abstract statements of general propositions, and individual rules, that is, adjudications. In view of the importance which the author attaches to legal
certainty as an essential element in the concept of legal system, he
insists that the existence of legal rules implies that they be manifested
in such manner as to be actually formulated, or capable of being formulated, in human language, by such.means as to render them "generally
knowable." It is interesting to note that his theory as to the limits
on treating the decision in an individual case as an expression of the
general rule of law that may be implicit in it, derives almost wholly
from his view that it is a very inadequate "sign vehicle" for conveying
the meaning of general rules. Moreover, the concept of a legal system
is asserted to imply also that those who are to be bound by its rules
be able to determine by some means whether a rule that purports to
be a legal rule is such in reality. A whole essay is devoted to discussing court systems as a mechanism through which this may be achieved.
It would extend this review too far to go into any -detailed discussion
of the very interesting questions considered in it. These range from the
theory of the separation of powers to the problem of how far, if at all,
a legal system can escape the necessity of permitting its judicial and
administrative organs to determine the scope of their own competence
to act. Suffice it to say that he deems the concept of a legal system to
imply the existence of a mechanism which is empowered by legal rules,
defining its competence, to test the legality of acts that claim to be in
accordance with law. While he recognizes that this is usually a system
of courts, he holds'that it is purely a matter of convenience whether
this shall be done in all cases by a single agency or by more than one.
It is at this point that he discusses the place of administrative law in a
legal system.
The essay on court systems contains a very interesting analysis of
the problems whether, and to what extent, individual decisions should
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be permitted to function as a "sign vehicle" of a general rule of law.
He connects this discussion with that of how far judicial precedents
should have binding force. The view is expressed that an individual
decision should be treated as a binding precedent for a future case
involving similar factual situations. He doubts that the general principle implied by a previous decision should be so regarded. The basis
for the difference is ultimately found in the differences of the attitudes
and habits of people and judges towards these two situations. It should
also be noted that the difference in the author's position with respect to
these two matters is closely connected with his idea that the concept of
a legal system implies that its rules be "generally knowable." However,
he concludes that the question of how far courts and other public agencies should be bound by precedent is a practical one which each particular legal system must decide for itself. The concept of a legal system requires some mechanism for enabling those subject to its rules to
discover what those rules are, but does not require that mechanism to
conform to any particular model in respect of the influence that precedents are to possess.
The final essential element implied in the concept of a legal system
is that of legal security. By this he means no more than that quality
of a legal system of having its rules as certain and predictable as is
permitted by the nature of the matters with which they deal. Here
again the importance of having the legal rule "generally knowable" is
stressed. The author correctly states that legal security is logically to be
'distinguished from social security, however much it may in fact contribute to the latter. The essay concludes with a discussion of the technique for achieving legal security within a legal system. This part of
the book is none too dear.
It is apparent from the foregoing summary of the contents of these
essays that they achieve unity because they all rest upon a common
philosophy of the state and the function of a legal system therein. The
author has selected as the necessary elements in the concept of a legal
system those features of modem liberal states that distinguish them from
their totalitarian competitors. The formal definition of a concept has
been used as an instrument for elaborating his theory of the desirable
state. It is a politically organized society in which ruler as well as
ruled is subject to and controlled by legal rules that should be "generally knowable" as such by the ruled as well as the ruler, and in
which exists a system by which the ideal of administration under and
according to law may be realized in practice. The author's treatment is
stimulating as well as interesting. He has avoided the dogmatism that
so frequently characterizes those who deal with problems of values
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under the guise of developing the formerly essential elements of a given
concept.
HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER.

University of Minnesota Law School.
Law as Logic and Experience. By Max Radin. New Haven: Yale
University Press. 1940. Pp. ix, 171. $2.00.
This book is more than a little puzzling until it dawns on the reader
that what is before him is merely a procession of ideas just as they
marched through the mind of one Max Radin. It is a Coxey's army
of ideas, loosely organized. It barely escapes being a mob of ideas.
Or, to change the figure, we seem to get the author's thoughts hot off
his brain just as they occur to him. The book depends for coherence
largely on the fact that all the ideas are about law and its administration.
A reviewer should outline the central idea developed in the book reviewed. In this book there is none. It is true that the author purports
to examine the place of logic and the place of experience in the law, and
that he does come to a conclusion, which is that law is a technique of
administering a complicated social mechanism, which technique can
dispense with neither logic nor experierice. Indeed, logic and experience
both do not suffice; there must be added to these a sense of justice.
However, the place of logic and experience in law is not an inquiry
developed throughout in this book, it is simply a matter to which the
author from time to time recurs. The book, as said before, is a crowd
of ideas; law as logic and experience is simply a pretext for calling
the crowd together in general assembly.
Perhaps it is worth mentioning that one idea in the crowd is bigger
and taller than the rest, and seems to get more attention than its
neighbors, measuring attention by inches of type. That is the idea
that courts aim at the impossible task of reconstructing the past in order
to pass judgment thereon, whereas their effort should be to make adjustments which will insure a satisfactory future.
This review has laid down the proposition that this book is a Coxey's
army of ideas. We may borrow from the metaphysical jurists and add
that all the rest of the review may be deduced from that one proposition. First, as to the excellence of the book. It is a good book, it is a
bad book, it is a medium book. That is, the ideas are of all three kinds.
To take an example of a good idea, Professor Radin says (p. 39) that
of the thousands of administrative officials in the United States "many
of them are either unqualifiedly judges under other titles or at various
degrees of evolution into judges." Very good; but this idea is not
much expounded, it is simply marching along with its fellows. Next
to it (p. 38) marches a bad idea. The administrative officers "perform
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a judicial function when they issue statements involving 'ought' or
'may' and when these statements are treated by those who are unmistakably judges as binding on them, even if binding to only a slight
degree." This novel definition of a judicial function would seem to
fit the legislative or regulation-making function of administrative officers just as well. Another good idea is to be found in Professor
Radin's excellent exposition of the fact that judges in judging can never
have the whole truth before them, but. only a more or less imperfect and
partial reproduction of events and of life past and gone. Off hand this
would seem to be a highly pessimistic proposition, since, for example,
no judge can by any technique ever obtain out of the past all there is to
be known about any murder and murderer. Probably before any murderer could be condemned with complete justice the judge would be
obliged to have at his diisposal all knowledge of all things. But the fact
that final justice awaits the judgment of God does not detract from the
value of thorough comprehension, of human justice, and this idea stated
by Radin contributes to such comprehension.
Among the bad ideas in Professor Radin's troop some are quickly
recognized as disreputable camp followers come from other camps.
Thus we have frequently seen among the Realists the shabby idea that
law is composed of the actual judgments of judges, that lawyers in
stating law are only forecasting the conduct of judges, (p. 37) etc. A
companion idea is that law deals only with the exceptional or marginal
situations when people clash. (p. 28). On the contrary law exists
largely to prevent such clashes, and largely succeeds. Thus I drive
my car on the right side of the road, and I record deeds running to me;
the law exists, for me, as a means of ordering my conduct so as to
escape those exceptional or marginal situations which Professor Radin
says are the ones with which law deals. Further, it takes a good deal
of the rationalizing ostensibly abhored by Realists to boil down, let us
say, the law of the road, until at the bottom of the pot we have nothing
left but a prediction about the conduct of judges. However, I am not
trying to convict Professor Radin of being a Realist; I merely hold that
some of his ideas look like suspicious characters I have met before.
The book is livened by an almost constant play of wit, most of it
of a high brder; but at times the combination of jurisprudence andl
banter produced to the reviewer a grotesque effect which may have
been traceable to the limitations of the reviewer instead of those of the
book at any rate the effect tended to disappear as he advanced in the
book and became more familiar with the author's style. Unlike most
of his fellow law writers Professor Radin really has a style, one which
transcends mere utilitarianism. But although much of his book is
written in English of excellent literary quality, there is no consistency,
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even in this. There are even occasional grammatical atrocities. The
search for the antecedent of "they" in line eight page sixty-two may
prove to be as baffling as the search for living reality by evidence about
past events, which search Professor Radin was in process of discussing.
The most frequent vice in this book is the assertion of one of many
possible points of view as if it were the only possible point of view.
Thus the author insists (p. 124) that courts legislate when they
determine whether power to legislate exists. But if the constitution
is, as it professes to be, and until recently was, the supreme law of the
land, and courts in deciding between two parties to a controversy apply
the highest law to the exclusion of an inconsistent inferior law, the
assertion that the courts are legislating is by no means undebatable. Professor Radin's view would result in holding that courts become administrative bodies every time they determine the power of an administrative bo'dy. However, there is no satisfaction in criticising this author
for such shortcomings, because the reviewer has the impression that
Professor Radin is perfectly capable of seeing the ideas on the other
side himself; indeed, that if those ideas had happened to cross his mind
while he was writing he might have tossed them into the book somewhere.
A book consisting of ideas just as they occur to a clever and brilliant
man is a good book for those who like that sort of thing. The present
reviewer fears to applaud very loudly lest others less intelligent than
this author be encouraged to follow his example. Instead of concluding this review with the usual note of praise I shall conclude it with
a word of warning. This book is the printed version of the Storrs
lectures on jurisprudence given at Yale. Writers on jurisprudence
should be wary of printing their popular lectures, because giving popular lectures is likely to lure the jurist into discarding the complicated
verbiage which passes for profundity in this field. Stripped of the
mighty abstractions in which jurisprudential ideas are normally clothed,
some of the ideas look puny and unimposing, like sheared cats.
FRANK HANFT.

Chapel Hill, N. C.

